GPS is one of those quiet technologies you only notice when it fails. It guides everything from precision weapons to the map app that reroutes you around a traffic jam, and it also helps keep time for modern digital systems. Now the Pentagon is confronting an uncomfortable reality. The long-delayed software meant to run the U.S. military’s GPS constellation is still not operational.
In testimony to Congress, Air Force space acquisition chief Thomas W. Ainsworth said OCX surfaced “extensive system issues across all subsystems” during operationally relevant testing, and many remain unresolved.
With costs approaching $8 billion, the Space Force is weighing whether it makes more sense to keep fixing OCX or lean harder on upgrades to the older ground system it was supposed to replace. That is a high-stakes choice for a system so widely relied on.
What OCX was supposed to unlock
OCX is the control system meant to command and monitor a GPS constellation of more than 30 satellites, including newer GPS III spacecraft that began launching in 2018. In practical terms, this is the software and ground infrastructure that tells satellites what to do, verifies they are healthy, and manages new signals.
The big prize is the military-only “M-code” signal, built to be more resistant to jamming and harder to spoof with fake navigation signals. In a March 2026 statement to lawmakers, Space Force Lt. Gen. Douglas A. Schiess called jamming and spoofing “a current and growing threat” to GPS, and noted that GPS underpins daily life “from ordering a rideshare to credit card transactions.”
OCX is also supposed to bring stronger cyber defenses and improved civil-signal operations. That matters because GPS is not just a military tool. It is an infrastructure layer shared by civilians, allies, and the U.S. government, all at once.
A handoff that did not equal readiness
The Space Force says OCX achieved formal government acceptance in 2025, moving the program from contractor-led development testing into government-led testing. That transition was supposed to be a turning point after years of defects and schedule slips.
Instead, the more realistic tests triggered more bad news. Ainsworth told Congress that testing with “actual GPS satellites, ground antennas, and user equipment” increased the discovery of system-wide problems, many of which still have not been resolved. The hard part showed up right when the system started facing real-world conditions.
So what do you do when the satellites are there but the software is not ready to run them? Air & Space Forces Magazine reports the Space Force is assessing options, including the possibility of canceling OCX outright, while continuing GPS operations on the legacy system and its incremental upgrades.
How a $3.7 billion plan became an $8 billion problem
When the Pentagon awarded the OCX contract in 2010, it was expected to be completed in 2016 for about $3.7 billion. Today, the official cost for the GPS III ground system is $7.6 billion, and a further OCX upgrade for GPS IIIF support is projected to cost more than $400 million, pushing the total effort to roughly $8 billion.
Those numbers are a symptom of a deeper pattern that watchdogs flagged years ago. In 2017 testimony, the Government Accountability Office said the Air Force faced “significant difficulties” developing OCX and had “consistently overstated its progress” to Pentagon leadership.
GAO also pointed to “poor acquisition decisions” and a slow recognition of development problems, noting that early work began before completing key preliminary reviews. In 2016, the Air Force told Congress OCX had breached a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost threshold, a formal alarm bell for major defense acquisition programs.
The security clock is moving faster than the software
The irony is that parts of GPS modernization are moving ahead while the control segment lags. Schiess says GPS III offers improved accuracy and anti-jamming performance over legacy satellites, alongside the more powerful encrypted M-code signal.
But full capability depends on the whole chain, including satellites, ground control, and user equipment in platforms like aircraft, ships, and missiles. In its FY2025 annual report, the Pentagon’s independent test office warned that continued delays to OCX put “U.S. warfighters and allies at risk” because full M-code has not been deployed for operational use.
That is why the older ground system keeps getting patched. DOT&E describes the Operational Control System Architecture Evolution Plan, or AEP, as upgrades that already allow command and control of GPS III satellites and provide core M-code capability through “M-code Early Use.” It is the workaround that has become the workhorse.
What happens if OCX is canceled
The Space Force is not without options, but none are painless. Ainsworth said “continued AEP modernization is now a viable option” as OCX’s systemic issues persist, which is about as close to an official Plan B as you get in congressional testimony.
Air & Space Forces Magazine reports the service is weighing how to keep pace with GPS III and GPS IIIF needs if it stays on the AEP path, including support for additional civil signals and the next GPS IIIF satellites.
DOT&E notes the Space Force accepted OCX from the development contractor in July 2025 and still plans a constellation transfer in fiscal 2026, suggesting decision-makers are trying to keep the door open.
For RTX and for the Pentagon’s broader software modernization push, the OCX debate is a reminder that delivering a system is not the same as fielding it. If the Space Force ultimately chooses to cut its losses, future contractors could face tougher proof-of-performance expectations well before a formal handoff.
The official statement was published on the House Armed Services Committee.
